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Introduction 
As the agricultural sector adjusts to financial stress and constantly changing 
national and international policies, additional structural changes are expected . 
The capacity for adjustrnent through existing agricultural asset markets depends 
on both the extent of farm restructuring and the resiliency of the markets and 
agricultural institutions. Research is needed to estimate farm financial 
restructuring needs and the expected duration of the restructuring process. 
Projecting the magnitude of change needed for financial stability in agriculture 
would help in assessing the ability of existing markets and institutions to 
manage restructuring. Policies to alleviate farm financial stress could then be 
judged for appropriateness and effectiveness. 
Α survey ofthe literature indicates that empirical research related to farm 
financial stress has been largely descriptive with some analysis of survivability 
and policy impacts on typical or representative farms. Analysis of farm 
operator's responses to state and national surveys are used to determine the 
incidence and intensity offarm financial stress in the United States (Johnson, 
Morehart, and Erickson 1987; Jolly et al. 1985; National Economics Division, 
1935). Other studies assess the farm's survival ability or financial behavior 
under νaried economic conditions (Barkema and Doye, 1985; Barry, 1986; Baum 
and Richardson,1983; Mapp and Walker, 1986a; Musser, White and Smith, 1984; 
Richardson and Condra, 1984; Thompson and Hanson, 1983; τweeten et al., 
1984). Researchers describe potentialliquidity and solνency problems and 
possible firm-level responses to stress giνen a specific farm description. Their 
microeconomic models, as controlled experiments, isolate the impacts of policy or 
environmental changes on a giνen farm. They proνide a quantitative 
understanding of likely responses and details that are complementary to 
information provided by macroeconomic models. However, inferences about 
sectoral changes are not possible from microeconomic projections based on typical 
or representatiνe farms. · 
Few researchers haνe attempted to provide empirical results reflecting costs 
offinancial stress and stress alleviation policies for the agricultural sector (Food 
and Agricultural Policy Research Institute, 1986; Boehlje et al., 1985). The 
aggregate analyses in Boehlje et al. were completed using an econometric model 
ofthe agricultural sector. Since no attempt was made to develop the link between 
microeconomic responses and aggregate effects, no insights into the dynamics of 
farm financial restructuring are proνided. 
Our study was undertaken to improve understanding of the structural 
changes required to achieve financial stability in agriculture. Α link between 
individual farm responses to financial stress and the agricultural sector 
responses is developed. The financial restructuring needs ofUnited States 
2 
commercial farms1 are investigated using data from a national survey offarms 
(Farm Journal and FAPRI Stafi). Α cash flow model uses the survey data to 
simulate farm operators' need to adapt to economic conditions. This publication 
describes in detail the analytical techniques employed and the model 
specification. Proposed programs to alleviate farm financial stress are analyzed 
using the model and policy results are reported to demonstrate the flexibility of 
the simulation program. 
Our research differs from other studies in several significant ways. First, 
current financial characteristics of heterogeneous farms are used to determine an 
individual farm's financial growth or disinνestment oνer time. Second, a direct 
link exists between adjustment on farms and projected changes for the 
agricultural sector since changes in asset and debt holdings at the farm level are 
aggregated to estimate the sector's response. Because ofthese two innovations, 
the estimated impacts ofnational financial policies on farms should be more 
realistic. 
The estimated restructuring needs and analysis ofpotential policies provide 
valuable insights into the potential shift of agricultural resources precipitated by 
farm financial stress and the potential costs offederal policies to alleviate farm 
financial stress. Potential changes in the socioeconoπιic and financial 
characteristics ofthe farm population from adaptation to the economic 
environment are clearer. The research should prove valuable to agricultural 
policy makers struggling to address financial problems ofthe agricultural sector. 
Financial Condition ofFarm Operators 
According to Jolly et al. (1985), financial stress occurs when certain economic 
forces assault and break down the adjustment capability of an individual, a firm, 
or a specific sector ofthe economy. These researchers indicate that some ofthe 
factors contributing to stress--low returns to assets or the absence ofprofits--
signal resource owners to reallocate resources. Financial stress becomes counter-
productive when misallocation of resources, undesirable structural change, and 
losses of economic and human capital become excessive. 
Results ofa January 1985 survey ofUnited States farmers serve as a basis for 
this study and provide insights into the financial condition offarm operators. 
Data used are the results of a random sample ofUnited States farmers surveyed 
by Farm Journal (FJ), Iowa State Uniνersity, and the University ofMissouri 
ΙCommercial farms are delined here as farms with gross sales exceeding $40,000. Approximately 
two-thirds ofthe farms in the U nited States are classified as commercial farms using this definition. 
l 
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(Fann Journal and F APRI Staff, 1985). Α sample of 8,000 operators was drawn 
from the Fann Journal data base sampled from four regions: East, South, 
Central, and West (Figure 1). Approximately 20 percent ofthe surveys were 
returned. For this project, the data from 731 valid responses from commercial 
fann operators (those with sales of$40,000 or more per year) were used. Because 
the sample was drawn equally from the four regions and is not a random U .S. 
sample, regional FJ output is weighted using USDA numbers of commercial 
operators, assets, and debts by region to derive a U.S.value. 
Balance Sheet Statistics. Table 1lists balance sheet statistics by region and by 
debt-to-asset ratio. Α column labeled "FCRS" lists balance sheet statistics for 
commercial fanns by region as calculated from the USDA's 1985 Farm Cost and 
Return survey results (Baum, 1985). Within a region, fanns in the F J data set 
control more assets and have higher debt levels on average than FCRS fanns. 
Average debt-to-asset ratios by region for the two samples are similar. 
Table 1 indicates that fanns in the West have significantly higher average 
asset values per farm. Farms in the South are generally larger than farms in the 
East or Central regions. Average debt levels are also highest in the West but the 
Central region's average exceeds those ofthe South and East. The debt-to-asset 
ratio average is highest for the Central region at about 34 percent compared to 20 
to 25 percent for other regions. The weighted debt-to-asset ratio for the United 
States from the sample is 27.76 percent. 
Operator, Asset, and Debt Distributions. Table 2 shows the distribution of 
commercial operators and the assets and debts controlled by commercial 
operators in the FJ sample by region and by debt-to-asset ratio. More than half of 
the nation's commercial farms, nearly half ofthe assets held by commercial farm 
operators, and more than half ofthe debtheld by commercial farm operators is in 
the Central region. As a result, national statistics are greatly influenced by 
conditions in the Central region. The sample shows a larger share ofthe 
operators, assets, and debts in the Central region fall in the highly leveraged 
debt-to-asset ratio category (40 to 70) and in the very highly leveraged category 
(70 + ). More than 42 percent ofthe operators in the Central region fall into these 
two categories and these operators control 72 percent ofthe debt in this region . 
. . 
For the U ni ted States, 35 percent of commercial operators fall in the highly 
leveraged categories and control63 percent ofthe farm debt held by commercial 
operators. The debt held by financially stressed operators is backed by 27 percent 
ofthe assets held by commercial operators. Almost no debt is held by 30 percent 
ofthe U.S. commercial operators and they own 33 percent ofthe assets held by 
commercial operators. 
.... 
Figure 1. Regions Used in Analysis ofFinancial Condiιions in U.S. Agriculture. 
'Baum, 1985. 
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Table 2. Distribution ofComroercial Operators, Assets, and Debts in Farm 
Journal Sample. 
Debt-to-Asseι Raιio (percent) 
Region 0-10 10-40 40-70 70+ u.s.· 
East 
Operators 45.57 33.54 15.82 5.06 8.19 
Assets 49.17 32.38 15.04 3.40 5.90 
Debts 6.95 40.72 37.12 15.21 5.05 
South 
Operator 32.20 38.14 19.49 J Ο. 17 23.76 
Assets 39.15 45.09 12.68 3.08 25.63 
Debts 2.54 51.24 31.67 14.55 19.36 
Ceηtral 
Operator 26.85 30.56 23.15 19.44 55.50 
Assets 28.11 35.08 24.91 11.90 47.35 
Debts 1.61 25.63 39.09 33.67 55.78 
West 
Operator 33.47 38.91 17.57 10.04 12.56 
Assets 31.93 44.79 18.31 4.96 21.12 
Debts 5.14 37.81 40.06 17.00 19.81 
United States 
Operator 30.49 33.66 20.98 14.88 ] 00.00 
Assets 32.99 39.54 19.80 7.67 ] 00.00 
Debts 2.76 33.76 37.75 25.73 ] 00.00 
F.C.R.S.b 
Operator 34.55 34.44 19.08 11.92 100.00 
Assets 38.56 36.26 17.33 7.86 100.00 
Debts 3.27 32.78 34.18 29.79 100.00 
•Baum, 1985. 
bEcoηomic Research Service, 1985c. 
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Consequences ofFarm Financial Stress 
Α changed microeconomic financial structure for many farms contributes to 
liquidity problems and mak.es them more vulnerable to risk from income 
variability, collateral and equity erosion, interest rate volatility, and changes in 
lenders' policies. Α crop failure, lower market prices, higher interest rates, or a 
reduction in a line of credit can dramatically affect the viability of a struggling 
farm. Given the number ofhighly leveraged farms, it seems likely that many 
will be forced to partially or completely liquidate assets to meet debt obligations. 
The capability of existing agricultural input markets to handle financial 
restructuring depends ο η the extent of restructuring and the resiliency of the 
insti tutions involved. Financial asset markets perform much of the 
restructuring. The Federal Reserve system believes that potentiallosses and 
bank failures are not a threat to the banking system nationally (Comptroller 
General ofthe United States, 1985). Likewise, Farm CreditAdministration 
officials, the federal regulators of the Farm Credit System, maintain that the 
FCS, although experiencing huge losses and facing a tough battle in restoring 
borrowers' confidence is not close to failing (Webster, 1986). And, since the 
FmHA is a government agency, its existence is not threatened by its troubled 
portfolio. 
Less is known about the financial strength of other lenders who hold one-third 
of agricultural debt--life insurance companies, agricultural merchants and 
dealers, and individuals. Agricultural debt (primarily real estate debt) is 
generally a small portion ofthe life insurance company portfolio, so life insurance 
companies are generally not vulnerable to agricultural financial stress. 
Individuals and local merchants who have extended credit to farmers, however, 
may suffer immensely when farm loans deteriorate. The retired farmer or farm 
widow who expects to receive a steady income from the sale of assets may find 
themselves with a returned farm rather than a pension fund. 
Evidence ofthe impacts of agricultural financial stress on farm real estate 
markets appeared in the results ofthe annual Farmland Markets Survey 
(Economic Research Service, 1985a). In 1985 farmland sold by farmers increased 
by an estimated 22 percent from 1984. Acres sold by operators as a percentage of 
total acres offarmland purchased by operatorsjumped from 72 percent in 1983 
to 91 percent in 1984 (Ν ational Economics Division, 1985a). 
Farmland sales seem to have stagnated and asset prices have fallen 
dramatically. Although the acreage listed for sale increased, respondents to the 
Farmland Markets Survey indicated a decrease in the number of actual sales. 
The number ofsales reported for 1985 was the lowest since 1981. For land 
expected to remain in agriculture, prices per acre sold averaged 24 percent lower 
in 1985 than in 1984. Ifthe real estate market becomes saturated, the financial 
8 
stress of farm operators trying to restructure the farm by selling assets may be 
exacerbated. 
The long-run implications of changes in the number and size offarms for 
agriculture-dependent businesses and rural communities needs to be addressed. 
When changes in production agriculture are large, changes can be expected in 
agriculture-related industries and in rural communities. If, in addition to farms 
failing, local businesses begin to fail, the economic and social costs of farm 
financial stress are compounded. Business failures result in economic and 
human costs that affect the people directly inνolνed and other firms whose 
operations depend on the businesses that fail. Iffailures are concentrated in 
certain geographic areas, liquidation offarm assets may depress land and 
machinery markets. Seνere stress ίη a region may also precipitate 
unemployment problems, followed by adνerse effects on the tax base and reνenue 
structure ofthe community. 
Public Policies to Alleviate Farm Financial Stress 
The direction of government programs has been to shift responsibility for 
managing risk from the public to the private sector. Howeνer, the scope of 
financial problems in agriculture and potential costs to society in economic and 
human terms have precipitated discussion of goνernment interνention to 
alleνiate financial stress. Creditors and borrowers, both financially secure and 
potentially insolνent, haνe different perspectiνes on the stress problem and 
cσnsequently differ on recommendations for financial assistance for stressed 
farmers. Different solutions may be recommended depending on the perception of 
who or what is responsible for stress and who is expected to bear the costs of aid. 
Seνeral policies haνe been suggested to minimize social and economic costs 
associated with liquidating large numbers offarms. These include interest rate 
buydowns, principal write-offs, loan guarantees, and land holding companies. An 
interest rate buydown is a program in which the farmer or lender receiνes an 
interest subsidy; that is, some portion ofinterest due is paid by someone other 
than the borrower. Principal write-offs reduce the amount of outstanding debt 
for a farm. Loan guarantees by the federal goνernment reduce the potentialloss 
and subsequent risk to the creditor. Land holding companies purchase assets of 
stressed farmers, thus supporting asset markets and proνiding funds to the 
farmer for debt reduction. 
An interest rate buydown and a new Congressionally-chartered Capital 
Corporation to help deal with troubled loans were included in 1985legislation. 
Debt moratoriums have also been suggested and foreclosure moratoriums have 
been applied in some states. FmHA and seνeral states haνe implemented 
interest rate buydown programs. Some programs require direct public subsidies 
while some can be integrated into existing programs and markets. 
i 
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These programs or other financial policies: 
• Buy time for the operator and lender to make needed long term financial 
adjustments. Farmers can be encouraged to develop realistic 
reorganization and cash flow projections to stabilize the firms but may 
need time to implement changes. Financially stressed individuals may 
want to explore on and off-farm employment opportunities to determine 
the best use of talen ts and resources. 
• Redistribute the costs offinancial ;.tress. Since causes offinancial stress 
include macroeconomic policies and lenders' and farmers' financial 
practices, it is reasonable to expect the government to share costs of 
financial stress. Therefore, financial policy should be used to minimize the 
economic and human costs of adjustments to changing macroeconomic 
condi tions. 
Thus financial policy would facilitate change at the microeconomic level 
rather than substitute for it. 
The policy dilemma is in determining how aid can be provided ίη an efficient, 
equitable, and effective manner. The financial diversity of the farm population 
makes an appropriate public policy difficult to formulate and implement. Ideally, 
policy response should be targeted to problems of financial stress and should 
facilitate long-term adjustments at minimum cost. With flexible targeted 
programs, costs ofintervention can be contained and public investment can be 
protected. If some farms are destined to fail because of inefficiencies beyond cash 
flow problems, it could be a disservice to the operator and lender to keep that 
farm in operation. 
The objective ofintervention may influence the selection and use oftargeting 
mechanisms for financial stress alleviation programs. Ifthe objective of a 
program is to help only those with temporary cash flow problems, targeted 
programs can, in principle, direct financial aid to individuals with cash flow 
problems who are not threatened by insolvency. For instance, farms with 
moderate amounts ofremaining equity may be able to correct temporary cash 
flow problems given either financial aid or time to restructure. If, on the other 
hand, the primary goal of the public program is to buy time for insolvent or 
failing farms to sell out, targeted programs can be directed to the farms in the 
most dire straits. 
The amount of subsidy provided by an entity--federal or state government, 
agriculturallender--may depend partially on the financial resiliency ofthe 
entity. Lenders who are financially vulnerable may not be in a position to aid 
their farm borrowers. Programs in which the state or federal government 
participates benefit lending institutions, as well as farm operators. Without 
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government funds, the lender absorbs all interest and principal payment 
shortfalls as well as debts that must be wri tten off. 
Both the scope ofthe program and the number ofeligible recipients help 
determine the costs ofthe buydown--the more limited the individual payments 
and the fewer the number ofindividuals who qualify, the lower the costs ofthe 
buydown to the government or lender providing the bu.;-down. General programs 
are potentially expensive because ofthe number offarms eligible, especially if no 
measures are taken to limit individual payments. Targeting payments to 
individuals with certain net worth or income characteristics reduces the number 
offarms eligible for buydowns. Establishing rate or payment maximums within a 
program limits the amount ofbuydown going to a single farm. 
Conceptual Model 
Shifts in asset and diobt holdings at the sector level reflect the net national 
effects of thousand~ of adjustments at the farm level. Το accurately estimate a 
sector response to a change in economic conditions or policy, microeconomic 
responses must be adequately embodied in the model. And given the 
heterogeneity offarm attributes, modeled microeconomic responses must reflect 
the heterogenei ty to be realistic. 
Modeling the financial adjustment path ofindividuals within the agricultural 
sector requires reliable estimates of cash J1ow, income, and balance sheets. The 
financial picture drawn from a farm's financial statements indicates the financial 
stability and growth potential ofthe firm. Α positive net farm income, together 
with a positive net cash J1ow and a modest equity position, provide the foundation 
for farm expansion or an increase in family living expenditures. Α negative cash 
J1ow and low owner equity signal the need for changes in the farm operation ifit 
is to remain viable. 
The cash J1ow model for a farm used in this research evolνed from our earlier 
research (Jolly and Doye 1985, 1986; and Doye, 1986). Net cash J1ow (NCF) for 
the farm operator family combines farm and nonfarm sources and uses of funds. 
NCF in this study is expressed as: 
NCF = R0 p*(A, + Ar)- c*Ar- (i+p)*D- CONS + OFI- ΤΑΧ (1) 
where Rop = cash rate ofreturn to operated assets 
Α, = value of owned assets 
Ar = value ofrented assets 
c = cash rental rate on rented assets 
\ 
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i = average rate ofinterest paid on outstanding debt 
p = average rate ofprincipal repayment on outstanding debt 
D = level of outstanding debt 
CONS = consurnption expenditures for the farrn farnily 
OFI = off-farrn incorne earned by the operator and spouse 
ΤΑΧ = federal incorne taxes paid by the farrn farnily. 
Farrn incorne, earnings attributable to owned and rented assets, equals 
Rop*(~ + Ar)- c*Ar and so is a function ofthe operator's tenure position. Debt 
financing costs are reflected in the i and p νalues. CONS and ΤΑΧ use cash frorn 
the operation while OFI contributes cash to the operation. Non-cash costs, 
capital consurnption and depreciation for instance, are not included. 
The potential for financial stress as indicated by a negatiνe NCF is 
particularly acute for farrns with no off-farrn incorne. Equation (1) can be 
rnanipulated to show that the farrn operator with no OFI, $15,000 in farnily liνing 
expenses, η ο rented assets, and no debt rnust own assets of$200,000 to project a 
positive cash flow with cash rates ofreturn of7.5 percent and rnust own $272,727 
worth of assets if 5.5 percent rates ofreturn prevail. 
Ifnet cash flow is negative, the farrn farnily rnust rnake changes in the farrn's 
financial structure to meet cash flow demands and reconcile differences between 
income and expenses. Traditional means of correcting financial problems include 
debt and asset restructuring, negotiation of debt repayment terrns, 
recapitalization through outside equity infusion, cost control, and improved 
management. 
Financial Restructuring 
The arnount offinancial restructuring necessary for an operator with negative 
NCF to break even can be deriνed from the NCF equation: 
ΔNCF = B*Rop*(Ao + Ar) + (1 + B)*Rop*( ΔΑο + ΔΑr) 
- c* ΔΑr- (i + p)* ΔD- ΔCONS + ΔΟFΙ (2) 
where ΔNCF = the change in net cash flow required to serνice all debt and pay 
for farnily liνing expenditures 
Β = the percentage change in Rop 
12 
ΔΑο = the change in owned assets occurring in the restructuring process 
ΔΑr = the change in rented assets 
ΔD = the change in outstanding debt as a result of debt retirement from asset 
sales or debt discharge by the lender 
ΔCONS = the change in family living expenditures 
ΔΟFΙ = the change in off-fann income. 
Necessary restructuring can be achieved, theoretically, by a change in any one of 
the decision variables. Το illustrate the eff(:cts ofvarious restructuring 
techniques using an average size fann with an average rate ofreturn, assume a 
fann operator owns assets valued at $700,000 that earn an average cash rate of 
return of 6 percent. Farm debts of$200,000 are to be repaid with an average 
interest rate of 10 percent and a principal repayment rate of5 percent. The fann 
family allows $15,000 for family living expenses, earns no off-fann income, and 
does not rent additionalland. Thus the projected NCF is: 
NCF = .06*($700,000)- (.10 + .05)*$200,000- $15,000 = - $3,000 
Το eliminate cash shortfalls, cash outflows can be reduced by decreasing 
family living expenditures or reducing production costs. If only the level of 
fami]y consumption is changed then the change in CONS required, ΔCONS, is: 
ΔCONS = NCF. (3) 
The required reduction in CONS is equa] to the cash shortfall, here the negative 
NCF. For the illustrated fanner, family living expenditures would be reduced by 
$3,000 (from $15,000 to $12,000) to eliminate the cash shortfall. 
Cash receipts might be increased or cash costs reduced through improved 
resource management, leading to higher rates ofreturns. The change in Rop 
needed to project a positive cash flow is: 
ΔRop = -NCF/(Ao + Ar). (4) 
In this example, an increase of less than one-halfpercentage point in the rate of 
return to operated assets would eliminate the cash shortfall: 
ΔRop = $3,000/$700,000 
= .0043 
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Off-farm income could be augmented by increasing the hours worked off-farm, 
changingjobs to receiνe a higher salary, or ensuring that nonfarm financial 
inνestments earn the highest possible rate ofreturn. Thus, a negative NCF could 
be offset by a corresponding increase in OFI: 
ΔΟFΙ = -NCF. (5) 
For example, an increase in OFI of$3,000 would be needed to break even. 
Asset restructuring alternatives include: 
1. Changing the amount of owned and rented assets. The η umber of acres 
operated could be increased by renting additionalland, thus increasing 
farm income as long as earnings from additional acres exceed rental costs 
and taxes. 
2. Trading low return assets for higher return assets. 
3. Giving asset title to the contract holder or lender. Eliminating a debt 
obligation by giving up an asset with a lien could be a relatively easy way 
to reduce or eliminate cash flow problems. 
4. Selling highly leνeraged assets (partialliquidation). 
5. Sale-leasebacks of assets. 
The assets to be rented or sold to reduce debt to a serviceable level depend on the 
size ofthe cash shortfall, the rate ofreturn earned by the assets, the cash recoνery 
rate, rental rates, and debt servicing costs. 
If cash income is to be increased by adding rented assets to the operation, then 
the required change in operated assets is: 
ΔΑr = - NCF/(Rop- c) (6) 
Note that adding rented assets is profitable only ifRop exceeds c. The change in 
cash flow associated wi th an increase in rented assets is equal to (Rop- c)* Ar. For 
the farm with a cash shortfall of $3,000, cash income can be increased $3,000 by 
renting $100,000 of assets ifRop = .06 and c = .03: 
ΔΑr = - 3,000/(.06- .03) = $100,000 
The extent of scaling back ofthe operation that would occur ifthe sale of 
assets were the only means of restructuring is 
Δ~= NCF/[Rop- alpha*(i + p)] (7) 
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where ΔΑ0 = assets liquidated 
alpha = aνerage cash recoνery rate from liquidated assets 
= ΔD/ ΔΑ. 
The cash recoνery rate, alpha, reflects changes in the market νalue of assets and 
market transaction costs such as taxes and broker's fees incurred in the 
liquidation process. If assets are sold for Jess than the amount Jisted ο η the 
ba]ance sheet, then the amount of debt that ι:an be retired from the sa]e of assets 
is Jess than a dollar-for-dollar exchange, i.e., a]pha is Jess than one. 
The farm operator with assets νa]ued at $700,000 and a cash shortfall of 
$3,000 wou]d be required to sell $44,444 ofassets to break eνen ifthe cash 
recoνery rate is 85 percent: 
Α0 = - $3,000/[0.06- .085*(0.10 + 0.05)] 
= $44,444. 
The sale of assets reduces the income generating capacity ofthe farm and results 
in lost income of $2,667 (or 0.06*$44,444) and thus an addition to the cash 
shortfall. Since assets νalued at $44,444 sell for a lower amount giνen a cash 
recoνery rate less than one, $37,777 in cash (alpha* Α0) is raised with asset sales. 
Reducing debt by $37,777 reduces interest and principal due--(0.10 + 0.50)*D by 
$5,667. The cash shortfall ($3,000 initially projected plus $2,667 due to reduced 
income generating capacity) is eliminated. 
If assets could be sold and leased back, thus remaining under control ofthe 
operator and earning income for the farm, then fewer assets would be sold 
(assuming the cash rental rate is less than the rate ofreturn to the asset): 
ΔΑο = NCFI[ c- alpha*(i + p)] (8) 
where c is the cash rental rate. Αο gives the amount of assets that would haνe to 
be sold and leased back at a positiνe net rate ofreturn to meet exactly cash flow 
needs. Using the example ofthe farm operator with a cash shortfall of$3,000, if 
cash rental rates are 5 percent ofthe asset's νalue, then 
ΔΑο = - $3,000/{0.05- [0.85*(.010 + 0.05)]} 
= $38,710. 
That is, $38,710 of owned assets would haνe to be sold and leased back to 
reduce debt to a serνiceable leνel. Note that future income earnings are lowered 
by the difference in earnings from owned an,! rented assets: 
4 j 
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ΔNCF = c*Ar (9) 
Debt restructuring might involve negotiation with the lender for a longer 
repayment period, deferred principal or interest payments, addition ofunpaid 
operating loans into real estate mortgages, lower interest rates, or a write-down 
in outstanding loan principal. Ifthe operator were able to convince the lender to 
write-down or discharge some ofthe outstΣ.nding debt, the amount of debt that 
would have to be discharged for the operator to break eνen is 
ΔD = NCF/[- (i + p)]. 
In our example, the change in debt required is 
ΔD = -$3,000/[- (0.10 + 0.05)] 
= $20,000. 
(10) 
With a write-down ofprincipal from $200,000 to $180,000, interest and principal 
due is reduced by $3,000, the amount ofthe cash shortfall. Debt restructuring 
possibilities may be limited by bank regulations or disincentiνes to the lender. If 
credit is imprudently extended to insolvent farm debtors or liquidation is 
delayed, the totalloss to creditors at liquidation may increase. 
The feasibility ofrestructuring alternatives depends on individual 
circumstances and the initial allocation ofresources ίη the firm. The alternatives 
are viable only if the opportunity for change exists. In some situations, the farm 
family that has been financially pressed for several years may have availed 
themselves ofmost opportunities to change. Iffamily consumption has already 
been decreased to a minimum, all debt restructuring possibilities have been 
exhausted, and rentalland is not profitable, then sale offarm assets to retire 
outstanding debt may be forced on the farm family. If debt and asset 
restructuring have been attempted and still the farm business is financially 
failing, totalliquidation or bankruptcy can be used to exit farming. 
FirmGrowth 
Farms with cash surpluses, instead ofbeing forced to restructure, may have the 
opportunity to expand the firm's asset base. From Equation (3), the amount of 
assets that a firm with a positive cash flow can theoretically acquire is expressed 
as 
ΔΑσ = NCF/[(i + p)- Ή., ρ)]. (11) 
This assumes the operator willingly takes on debt to purchase as many assets as 
projected income and cash flow allow. Α farm with a cash surplus of$3,000, an 
average rate ofreturn of6 percent, an average interest rate of 10 percent, and a 
principal repayment rate of 5 percent could purchase $33,333 in assets: 
ΔΑ0 = $3,000/[(0.10 + 0.05)- 0.06] 
= $33,333. 
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Sίmulatίon Model 
The NCF and restructurίng equations specified earlier are used in simulating 
farm operators' adaptatίon or response to changes in economic conditions or 
goνernment policy. Interest payments are assumed to take first priority after 
rental and family Ιiνίηg expenses; prίncipal payments are made from residual 
ίncome. Princίpal paίd will be less than princίpal due ifNCF is negatiνe. 
In the simulation, financial adjustment follows a general sequence that holds 
for all operators (Figure 2). Indiνiduals with negative NCF restructure assets 
andlor debt so that interest payments can be made. In each case, the minimum 
amount of restructuring needed to break eνen is assumed to occur. 
The assumed restructuring process for farms with negative NCF is: 
1. OFI is increased. This assumes the operator or some member ofthe family 
ofworking age is initially underemployed and could find an off-farmjob or 
could increase hours worked or salary earned to improνe OFI. Or, it could 
mean that the rate ofreturn on off-farm investments increases. 
2. Rates ofreturn CRop) are improνed through cost control and improved 
management. 
3. Additional assets are rented to increase farm earnings ifrates ofreturn to 
operated assets exceed cash rental rates. 
4. On farms that qualify for financial assistance, proceeds ofprograms are 
applied to cash shortfalls. Financial aid prngrams are directed to farm 
operators who haνe made an effort to correct cash flow problems using all 
means except asset sales and yet are unable to make full interest or 
principal payments. Operators able to make all interest payments are 
assumed to be ineligible for financial assistance. 
5. Assets are partially liquidated with proceeds from asset sales used to retire 
debt. Ifprofitable, assets are leased back. 
6. Assets are sold and the operator leaνes farming if all efforts to restructure 
fail and the operation shows no immediate potential for a financial 
turnaround. Lenders are assumed to refrain from foreclosing if the farm is 
not failing financially. 
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Farm financial failure in the simulation occurs if any one ofthese three 
cri teria is met: 
1. The current market value of assets is less than outstanding debt, or the 
debt-to-asset ratio exceeds alpha, the cash recovery rate. These farms are 
technically insolvent. 
2. Assets are completely liquidated to project a positive cash flow. 
3. The ratio ofNCF to equity is less than- 0.2. Α negative NCF ofthis size 
would quickly add to debt and erode remaining equity. The farm would be 
expected to fail within several years. 
Farms that are technically insolvent, own η ο assets, or have severe financial 
problems as indicated by the NCF-to-equity ratio are assumed to exit the 
industry at the end ofthe year in which they are defined as financial failures. 
Α different series ofsteps is assumed for operators with a positive cash flow 
(Figure 2). Federal income taxes are paid. Residual income can then be used to 
increase family living expenditures at a rate determined by a regional marginal 
propensity to consume (Richardson, 1981) up to a maximum of $30,000. Cash 
remaining after taxes and additional family living expenses are paid is invested 
in farm assets, adding to the income generating potential ofthe firm. 
At year's end, an individual's principal payments are deducted from 
beginning debt. Ifrestructuring and policy benefits have not generated enough 
income for the farm to project a positive cash flow, interest or family living 
expense shortfalls are added to debt. Farms in the survey that fail financially are 
removed from the sample at the end ofthe simulated year in which they fail. 
NCF calculations for individual operators are summed to determine sample 
estimates ofprincipal and interest shortfalls and percentages of operators, assets, 
and debts falling in a particular category. Sector interest shortfalls are estimates 
ofthe difference between interest due and interest paid based on the summation 
ofthe differences on individual farms. Similarly, principal shortfalls for the 
commercial farm sector indicate the difference in principal due and principal paid 
based on the percentage difference projected from the sample. Total credit 
repayment shortfalls are the sum ofinterest and principal payment shortfalls. 
Principal shortfalls are generally larger than interest shortfalls since interest 
payment is assumed be the priority in the model. 
The modellooks at the effects ofleverage, cash flow constraints, and income 
on survivability. Hypotheses about economic behavior are based on observations 
of strategies used by farmers in coping with financial stress. Ν ο real decision 
theory for individuals is involved since the strategies for restructuring do not 
νary individually. Changes in financial position are restricted to responses to 
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stress for individuals with negative NCF and to accumulation of assets for 
operators with positive NCF. Operators do nototherwise change tenancy 
positions or management procedures in the simulation. 
Data and Parameter Estimation 
Rather than construct representative farms that reflect typical debt and asset 
positions for different types and sizes of farms, a sample of υ .s. farm operators is 
used as a basis for analysis. NCF is projected for individual farms using survey 
values for assets owned, assets rented, debt, and off-farm income. Using actual 
surνey data provides a simple, practical method to embody the heterogeneous 
attributes ofthe farm population. Because each operator's current asset holdings 
and financial position help determine future business opportunities (especially in 
the short run), beginning with a unique mix of debts, assets, and socioeconomic 
characteristics representative ofindividual farm households is important. By 
typifying farm units or assuming homoger.eous firms, responses to financial 
stress could be grossly miscalculated and costs to individuals would likely be lost 
in the aggregation. 
In the NCF equation, initial values for Αο. D, and OFI are taken from the 
survey responses. Balance sheet statistics by region and by debt-to-asset ratio for 
the F J survey are listed in Table 2. Sample operator, asset, and debt 
distributions are listed in Table 3. 
Assets Rented 
FJ sample results indicate the number of acres rented but not the value of 
acres rented. As a proxy for this value, the number of acres rented was multiplied 
by an average real estate value, either the farm's aνerage real estate value 
estimated from survey data or the state average real estate value reported by the 
Economic Research Service (1984a). 
Rates of Return to Operated Assets 
Rop. the rate ofreturn to operated assets before principal and interest 
payments, is estimated from income and assetdata in the FJ survey along with 
cash rental rates reported in Farm Real Estate Market Developments: Outlook 
and Situation Report (Economic Research Service, 1985a): 
Ro = (FI + c*Ar)Ι(Ao + Ar) (12) 
where FI = farm income or, gross sales minus cash operating expenses (including 
land rental expenses). 
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Costs ofproduction are assumed to be the same on owned and rented land. 
Differences in income depend on land acquisition cost, either (i + p) for land 
purchased with borrowed money or c, the cash rental rate, for leased land. The 
average cash rate ofreturn to operated assets for the United States is 6.58 
percent. 
Table 3. Estimated Cash Rates ofReturn to Operated Assets by Region and Sίze 
of Operationa. 
Assets Operateιl Number of Cash Rates of Return <Rop) 
Region (τhousands Observations 
ofDollars) inSample Year ιa Year2 Year 3 
East < 450 54 7.56 7.11 6.65 
540-780 55 5.24 4.93 4.61 
> 780 49 4.61 4.34 4.05 
South < 863 59 6.46 6.08 5.68 
> 863 59 5.07 4.77 4.46 
Central <457 54 9.05 8.51 7.96 
457-730 54 7.57 7.12 6.66 
730-1,239 54 7.33 6.89 6.45 
> 1,239 54 5.46 5.14 4.80 
West < 586 60 6.63 6.24 5.83 
586-1,019 60 5.96 5.61 5.24 
1,019-1,964 60 4.85 4.56 4.27 
> 1,964 59 3.19 3.00 2.81 
• Rates ofreturn for year 1 are estimated from FJ sample data. 
Rop averages are estimated by region (East, South, Central, and West) and by 
size offarm ίη an attempt to develop relatively homogeneous groups for which 
income aggregation bias is rninirnized (Table 3). In all regions, as the size of 
operation increased average Rop declines. Thίs result is somewhat unexpected 
since most studies of.farm income show constant or increasing returns to size. 
Declinίng average rates ofreturn could reflect decreasing income per unit or 
ίncreasing costs per unίt, perhaps due to labor and management constraints. 
Another explanation is that smaller farms are different from larger farms. For 
instance, livestock farms rnight be smaller than crop farms in assets operated and 
rnight generate higher rates ofreturn. Finally, some previous studies may 
attribute income earned by rented assets to owned assets, thus overstating 
income for owned assets and farm size. 
~ 
! 
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ln projections over time, rates of return are tied to Food and Agricul tural 
Policy Research Institute projections of cash income before interest. Rates of 
return for a given farm are assumed to decline at the same rate as projected net 
cash income before interest for the sector. 
Off-farm Income 
OFI for cornmercial operators in the FJ sample averaged $8,000. The average 
OFI figure declined as farm size, measured by gross sales from farm products, 
increased. For farms with sales of$40,000-$100,000, the mean OFI figure was 
$10,295. Farms with sales ofmore than $500,000 reported an average of $4,290 
OFI. This contrasts with USDA statistics (Economic Research Service, 1985b), 
which show OFI increasing from $9,298 for farms with sales of $40,000-$100,000 
to $14,126 on farms with sales exceeding $500,000. 
Cash Rental Rates 
Cash rental rates are estimated from the Agricultural Land Values and 
Markets Outlook and Situation Report (Economic Research Service, 1985a) for 
ten production regions used by the USDA: Northeast, Lake States, Corn Belt, 
Northern Plains, Appalachia, Southeast, Delta, Southern Plains, Mountain, and 
Pacific. Rental rates are expressed as a percentage ofland value (Table 4). The 
rates range from 3.2 percent in the Ν ortheast to 8.3 percen t in the Ν orthern 
Plains. When used in the model for projections over time, cash rental rates 
remain the same, or decline ifthey exceed Rop to one percentage point less than 
the cash rate ofreturn. Although many ofthe farms may have "share rents", 
there are no regional statistics on average costs per acre so cash rental rates are 
used as a best estimate ofrental costs. 
Cash Recovery Rates 
Alpha, the cash recovery rate, determines the market νalue offarm assets 
when sold and is based on the change in farm real estate νalues reported by the 
USDA (Economic Research Service, 1985a). Alpha values used in the model are 
listed in Table 6. ln the first year alphas ranged from 95 percent in the East to 76 
percent in the Central regioή. ln projections oνer time, the cash recoνery rate 
was assumed to decline by 10 percentage points from the original νalue in the 
second year and an additional 5 percentage points from the original value in the 
third year ofthe projection. Thus, moderate declines in land values (or increases 
in transactions costs) are assumed for 1986 and smaller declines are assumed for 
1987. When a land holding company is in place, land values are assumed to be 
stabilized by the ready buyer, and cash recoνery rates are constant oνer time. 
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Interest and Principal Repayment Rates 
Since maturities and other terms of existing debt on surveyed farms are not 
known, the average interest rate and principal repayment rates are set at a 
constant 10 percent and 5 percent, respectively. The 5 percent principal 
repayment rate implies that the average life of allloans not repaid in the year in 
which they are made is 20 years. For example 1) 75 percent of an operator total 
debt is intermediate or long term debt with the other 25 percent to be repaid in 
the current year and 2) one-third ofintermediate and long term debt (25 percent 
ofthe total) is intermediate debt with a term ofseven years and the remaining 
two-thirds (50 percentofthe total) is long term debt debt with a term of35 years, 
then the average principal repayment rate is .2517 + .50/35 = .05. 
Family Living Expenses 
Family consumption expenditures are assumed to be a minimurn of$15,000 in 
all cases. For farms with a positive cash flow, family living expenses can increase 
up to a rnaxirnurn of$30,000 at rates determined by regional rnarginal 
propensities to consurne (Richardson, 1981). Regional rnarginal propensities to 
consurne are listed in Table 4 and range frorn 14.1 percent in the Lake States to 
56.2 percent in the Mountain States. 
Table 4. Estimated Cash Rental Rates, Cash Recovery Rates, and Marginal 
Propensities to Consume by Region (percent) 
I Cash Cash Recoνery Rates 
I U.S.D.A. Region Rental 
I Rates• Year 1 Year2 
' 
Northeast 3.20 94.09 84.09 
Lake States 6.53 81.00 71.00 
Corn Belt 7.36 75.60 65.60 
Ν orthern Plains 8.33 77.00 67.00 
Appalachia 3.75 91.00 81.00 
Southeast 4.17 95.50 85.50 
Delta 5.80 91.00 81.00 
Southern Plains 3.92 85.50 75.50 
Mo..ιntain States 4.72 89.87 79.37 
Pacific 5.31 89.67 79.67 
a Cash rental rates are expressed as a percent of asset value. 
b Richardson, 1981. 
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Taxes 
Federal income tax estimates are made only for operators with positive NCF. 
Other operators are assumed to have no federal income tax liability. Taxable 
income for the farm in the computer program is defined as farm income less 
rental and interest expenses and deductions plus OFI. Tax rates taken from 1985 
Package Χ tables (Department ofthe Treasury, 1985). Four dependents were 
assumed for operators less than 45 years old or more than 65 years old; two 
dependents are assumed in other cases. 
Sector Estimates of Operators, Asset!>, and Debts on Commercial Farms 
V alues for assets owned and debt held by commercial operators play an 
important role in this study. Sector values for assets and debts are applied to 
sample percentages estimated through simulation to determine magnitudes of 
interest and principal shortfalls and volumes of assets sold and debt liquidated. 
The total number of commercial farm operators based on USDA estimates is 
636,456 (National Economics Division, 1985b). 
Average balance sheets from the FJ survey imply a sector value of$127 
billion for debt ($199,726 per farm Χ 636,456 commercial farms) and $458 billion 
for assets ($719,540 per farm Χ 636,456 commercial farms). This method of 
estimating aggregate values is consistent with underlying sample values. Sector 
values for assets and debts estimated from the FJ sample are applied to regional 
percentage distributions to get regional values. Regional percentage 
distributions of commercial operators, assets, and debts are based on FCRS 
results (Baum, 1985). Table 5 lists the percent and number of commercial 
operators by region and the percent and value of assets and debts by region. 
Simulation Results 
The simulation program was designed to estimate likely magnitudes of 
restructuring in the agricultural sector resulting from efforts ofindividuals to 
achieve a positive or break even cash flow. Α number of scenarios were developed 
to examine the impact ofvarious restructuring options--changes in off-farm 
income, rates ofretum eamed, amount of assets owned and rented--on debt 
servicing capability (Doye, 1986). The results reported here focus on two 
scenarios. In the first "worst case" scenario, the only means ofrestructuring 
available to farms with a negative NCF is sale of assets. In the second scenario 
(the baseline scenario), limited changes can be made in the amount of off-farm 
income earned, rates ofreturn to assets, and the amount of assets rented to 
improve cash flow. The baseline scenario (BASE) is used in interest rate and rate 
ofreturn sensitivity tests, in projections over time ofrestructuring without public 
intervention, and in simulation offinancial stress alleviation programs. 
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Table 5. Sector Estimates of Operators, Assets, and Debts of Commercial Farms 
byRegion. 
East South Central West U.S. 
Operat.ors 
Percentιι 8.2 23.8 55.5 12.6 100 
Number 52,126 151,222 353,233 79,939 636,456 
Assets 
Percent• 5.9 25.6 47.4 21.1 100 
Amount($8) 27 117 217 98 458 
Debt 
Percent• 5.1 19.4 55.8 19.8 100 
Amount ($8) 6 25 71 25 127 
•8aum, 1985. 
In the results, asset percentage figures are expressed as a percent oftotal 
sample assets, debt figures as a percent of total sample debt, and operator figures 
as a percent oftotal sample operators within a region. The sample percentages 
are multiplied by sector estimates ofthe number of commercial operators and the 
value of assets and debts owned by them to project number of operators or dollar 
value of assets and debts in a giνen category. 
Statistics reported in simulation results are defined as: 
1. The percent of assets sold includes assets sold by farms that fail financially 
and assets sold by farms as part of the restructuring process. 
2. The percent of debt liquidated is debt held by financially failing farms and 
debt retired as part ofthe restructuring or repayment process. 
3. Debt written offis the remaining debt after proceeds from asset sales are 
applied to debt retirement on financially failing farms. 
4. The percen t of opera tors selling ou t shows the fraction of total opera tors 
who operate financially failing farms, that is, farms that cannot be 
restructured. 
5. The percent of operators scaling back includes operators who sell assets to 
reduce debt but maintain ownershi p of at least some assets. 
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6ο Operators wit.h negative NCF before selling assets is the surn of operators 
selling out and operators scaling back to project a positive cash flow ο 
7 ο The percent of operators wit.h negative NCF after restructuring indicates 
the percent of operators unable to rneet all financial obligations eνen after 
restructuringo It is the percent of operators selling out or the percent of 
operators wit.h financially failing farrnso 
80 The percent of operators with positive NCF after restructuring indicates 
the portion ofthe population that is able to pay all current obligations 
through restructuringo 
Restructuring through Unlirnited Asset Sales 
Table 6 gives estirnated national restructuring requirernents needed for 
comrnercial farrns to achieve sorne sustainable financial position assuming the 
only individual farrn adjustment that can be rnade is partial or cornplete asset 
liquidationo For farrns with negative NCF, debt is written offifthe value of 
assets owned is less than outstanding debto Because of the focus on short run 
financial problems, the objective offinancial adjustment is assurned to be a 
positive net cash flowo In the longer run, incorne leνels would have to be 
sufficient to replace capital and allow for savings or risk reserveso 
Estimates oftotal restructuring needs ofthe agricultural sector in Table 6 
provide a "worst case" scenario in which operators, because ofmarket conditions 
or individual circumstances, cannot improve their financial position through 
changes in rnanagement, off-farrn ernployment, or negotiations with the lendero 
The only alternative for farrns with negative NCF is to sell assets and use the 
proceeds to eliminate cash shortfallso Cash proceeds frorn liquidation of assets 
after all transactions costs are equal to the cash recovery rate tirnes the balance 
sheet value ofthe assets soldo 
Since restructuring requirernents are influenced by rates of return to farm 
assets, results are presented in a sensitivity tableo Three cash rates ofreturn to 
operated assets and cash recovery rate scenarios are simulatedo Α simple 
capitalization forrnula can be used to show that the cash recovery rate (alpha) 
changes in direct proportion to changes in rates ofreturn to the asset (Rop)o 
Hence the assumed percentage changes in alpha and Rop are equivalento The 
scenario with high rates ofreturn to operated assets and high cash recovery rates 
uses rates that are 10 percent higher than the expected rates listed in Tables 3 
and 40 The low return, low cash recovery rate scenario uses rates that are 10 
percent lower than the expected rateso 
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Table 6. Liquidation Required to Service Remaining Debt frorn Projected Cash 
Flows Under Different Cash Recovery Rate and Rate ofReturn 
Assurnptions in ''Worst Case" Scenario (percent). 
Region 
East 
South 
Central 
West 
U.S. 
East 
South 
Central 
West 
u.s 
East 
South 
Central 
West 
U.S 
Assets Debt 
Sold Liquidated 
Debt 
Written 
οιτ 
Operaιors 
Selling 
Out 
Operators 
Scaling 
Back 
Operators 
with 
Negative Assets 
NCF Purchased 
High Rates ofReturn to Operated Assets, High Cash Recoνery Rates 
5.8 29.8 0.8 1.9 27.9 29.8 11.6 
5.7 28.1 2.1 6.8 27.1 33.9 15.1 
24.4 63.0 4.3 13.9 31.9 45.8 16.3 
15.1 60.1 0.8 3.4 37.2 40.6 9.0 
16.6 54.0 3.0 9.6 31.4 41.0 14.1 
Expected Rates of Return ιο Operated Assets, Expected Cash Recovery Rates 
8.1 38.2 1.1 3.2 31.0 34.2 9.8 
8.1 35.4 2.7 9.3 27.1 36.4 !2.6 
32.2 77.1 7.7 19.0 33.8 52.8 13.0 
19.4 69.7 1.1 5.4 39.3 44.8 7.5 
21.9 65.6 5.1 13.4 33.0 46.4 11.5 
Low Rates of Return to Operated Assets, Low Cash Recoνery Rates 
11.6 48.7 1.6 5.1 37.3 42.4 8.1 
11.7 45.3 3.5 13.6 34.8 48.3 10.4 
40.9 89.1 10.1 20.8 40.3 61 .I 10.5 
24.5 79.1 1.8 9.2 40.6 49.8 6.0 
28.2 76.6 6.8 16.1 39.1 55.1 9.4 
Although 46 percentofoperators are projected to have negative NCF, similar 
projections by Jolly et al. (1985) indicate 43 percent of co=ercial farrns have 
negative cash flows. Restructuring requirernents for the Central region are much 
rnore severe than the national average 1 (Table 6). With expected rates ofreturn 
and cash recovery rates nearly one-third ofthe assets of co=ercial operators are 
sold and more than three-fourths ofthe debt are liquidated in the Central region. 
More than 50 percent of operators have a negative cash flow and alrnost 19 
percent must liquidate all assets to project a positive cash flow. 
1 
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In the simulation, all U.S. operators with a negative NCF sell assets to 
achieve a positive cash flow, either scaling back or selling out. Given expected 
rates ofreturn and cash recovery rates, approximately 22 percent ofthe nation's 
commercial agricultural assets are liquidated for all operators to eliminate cash 
shortfalls (Table 6). Only half of assets liquidated can be purchased by other 
commercial farms given their capacity to expand and service debt. Two-thirds of 
the outstanding debt (65.6 percent) of commercial operators is retired, assumed 
by purchasers, or discharged following liquidation offailing farm businesses. 
More than 13 percent ofU.S. operators liquidate all assets to resolve debt and 
cash flow problems. It should be noted that estimates ofthe number of operators 
selling out due to farm failures is quite sensitive to the technical insolvency 
criterion. Since one criterion for farm failure is a debt-to-asset ratio greater than 
the cash recovery rate, assurnptions about current rnarket value of assets help 
deterrnine the nurnber offarm failures. If, rather than using the cash recovery 
rate as the determinant oftechnical insolvency, a debt-to-asset ratio greater than 
one is used (a conservative criterion), the nurnber of financially failing farms 
drops from 13 percent to approxirnately 7.4 percent nationally. '!'he USDA 
estirnate ofthe percent of commercial farms with debt-to-asset ratios exceeding 
one is lower at 4.8 percent (Jolly et al., 1985). 
Lower rates ofreturn and cash recovery rates reduce the ability offarrners to 
service debt and increase the potential volurne ofliquidated assets. The 
combined impact ofhigher incornes and cash recovery rates is to irnprove cash 
flow, increase the debt servicing capability ofthe farm operator, and reduce the 
amount of assets sold to retire debt (Table 6). These results indicate the 
magnitude oftransition expected and dernonstrate the sensitivity ofresults to 
assumed rates of return and cash recovery rates. Most financially stressed 
operators can attain a positive cash flow by scaling back (33/46 or 71 percent). 
With higher rates ofreturn, the ability of financially stressed operators to service 
debt improves as does the ability offinancially stable operators to purchase 
assets. But, even with optimistic income expectations, large amounts of assets 
and debts change hands when sale of assets is the only restructuring option. 
The assets sold to project a positive cash flow--an estimated $101 billion or 22 
percent of $458 billion--indicate the total restructuring needs of the agricultural 
sector. Even ifthese asset sales are distributed over several years, the required 
rate of sales greatly exceeds historical sector annual average asset turnover 
rates. If the sales occur over five years, rnore than $20 billion in assets will be 
sold each year when, in 1984, farmland purchases were slightly rnore than $6 
billion (Economic Research Service, 1985a). 
Restructuring requirernents rnay be underestirnated if assurnptions that land 
values are maintained and that markets continue to function are not reasonable. 
The volume of assets changing hands when financially stressed farrns sell assets 
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suggests that market failure could occur and that assets would not sell. These 
results indicate the need for buying time for operators to restructure using 
existing markets. They also proνide reason for public programs to ease farm 
transition, possibly preventing agricultural market failures. 
Baseline Scenario 
Results from the baseline (BASE) simulation indicate likely magnitudes of 
restructuring when moderate adjustments can be made at the farm leνel to 
improνe cash flow before assets are sold. This scenario assumes that some 
potential for improνement in financial management at the microeconomic level 
exists. ln the baseline scenario, farm operators are assumed to be able to: 
1. Increase OFI by 5 percent or to $3,500 or to the point at which net cash flow 
is posi ti νe, whichever is least. Preνious simulations sr1 )Wed that this 
allowance does more to improve cash flow than a 10 percent increase in 
OFI (Doye, 1986). Apparently a significant number offarms in the sample 
with negatiνe cash flows haνe no OFI or very little OFI initially. Thus, a 
small OFI sum does more to improνe the farm's finances than a large 
percentage increase in the initial OFI. 
2. Increase Rop by 10 percent or to the point at which NCF is positiνe, 
implying that net cash income before principal and interest payments can 
be increased by 10 percent through cost control and improved farm 
management. Α farmer wbo owns and operates assets valued at $700,000 
with a 6.5 percent rate ofreturn has a projected farm income of$45,500. Α 
10 percent increase in the rate ofreturn yields an increase of $4,550 in 
farm income. Ifthe farmer operates 700 acres, the 10 percent increase in 
Rop is equal to an increase in income of $6.50 per acre. 
3. lncrease assets rented by an amount not to exceed 10 percent of assets 
operated. Α larger operated asset base allows farm operators in regions 
where estimated rates ofreturn to operated assets exceed cash rental rates 
to generate mυre income. Additional income can be used to service debt or 
coνer family liνing expenditures. 
Allowing moderate increases in OFI, Rop. and Ar reduces of sector-level assets 
and debts liquidated and operators selling out (Table 7). Asset sales are not 
initially included as part ofthe restructuring process because selling assets is a 
more drastic measure. Given the projected assets sold with the exit offailing 
farms, it is assumed that farms that can survive will retain ownership of assets in 
hopes of stabilizing the operation or receiving higher prices for the assets when 
sold. 
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Table 7. Regional Differences in Expected Restructuring for Υ ear 1 of BASE 
Scenario with Ν ο Intervention, United States. 
East South Central West U.S. 
Assets Sold 
Percent 3.4 3.4 10.1 6.3 7.2 
Amount($B) 0.929 3.990 21.809 6.194 32.839 
Debt Liquidated 
Percent 15.2 15.3 29.3 20.2 24.0 
Amount ($Β) 0.913 3.813 20.775 5.050 30.531 
Debt Written Off 
Percent 1.7 3.4 9.0 2.2 6.2 
Amount ($Β) 0.101 0.850 6.397 0.548 7.887 
Operators Selling Out 
Percent 5.7 12.7 15.3 9.6 13.2 
Amount ($Β) 2,969 19,223 53,966 7,693 83,821 
Operators with Negatiνe NCF 
Before Interνention 
Percent 22.8 25.4 38.4 37.2 33.9 
Number 11,874 38,441 135,747 29,769 215,822 
Interest Shortfall ($Β) $0.047 $0.238 $1.505 $0.673 $2.464 
Principal Shortfall ($Β) $0.112 $0.413 $2.258 $0.840 $3.620 
Total Shortfall ($Β) $0.158 $0.650 $3.763 $1.513 $6.083 
Assets Purchased 
Percent 9.8 12.6 13.0 7.5 11.5 
Amount ($Β) 2.633 14.707 28.102 7.321 52.716 
Regional Results of BASE Run 
From the BASE run, regional differences in nurnbers of operators in a given 
category and in restructuring needs are estimated (Table 7). Because commercial 
farms are concentrated in the Central region, nearly halfofthe assets sold and 
two-thirds ofthe agricultural debt retired through U.S. farrn financial failures 
occurs in the Central region. More than half ofthe total debt repayment 
shortfalls are in the Central region. 
The assets purchased figure (τable 7) indicates the sector's potential to absorb 
agricultural asset sales within the sector. It reflects the ability of solvent 
operators to purchase assets based on their current cash flow and equi ty 
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position.2 The figure reported may represent an upper bound since it assumes all 
farmers would use debt to purchase assets when, in fact, many operators prefer 
not to use credi t to expand their operations. It also assumes that regardless of the 
age ofthe farm operator or his desire to retire, iffinances permit, he will purchase 
assets. 
Assets sold by failing commercial farms could theoretically bepurchased by 
existing commercial farms in all regions. The percent of assets that could be 
purchased exceeds the percent of assets sold as insolvent operators exit the 
industry. The differential between assets purchased and assets sold is relatively 
small in the Central and West--3 percent in the Central region and 1 percent in 
the West. 
Sensitivity of BASE Results to Cash Rates of Return 
Table 8 indicates sensitivity of results to assumptions about prevailing cash 
rates ofreturn to operated assets. The three columns show projections uι .:ier low, 
expected, and high rates ofreturn. As in earlier results,low rates ofreturn are 90 
percent and high rates ofreturn are 110 percent of expected rates of return. Low 
rates ofreturn (LBASE) increase estimated interest shortfalls by about $1 billion 
and principal shortfalls by about $0.5 billion. Conversely, high rates ofreturn 
reduce interest shortfalls by $1 billion and principal shortfalls by $0.5 billion. 
Although higher average rates ofreturn to operated assets benefit all farms, 
the farms with positive cash flows because ofhigher rates ofreturns are those 
that were experiencing moderate and not severe financial stress. The farmers 
near breakeven are most affected by changes in economic condi tions and the 
bigεest impact is on their ability to make interest payments. Insolvent farmers 
or those near insolvency are rarely rescued by either improved returns or 
moderate restructuring efforts. Higher rates of return to failing farms merely 
reduce losses to the lender in debt and interest written off. Changes in returns to 
the farm sector also affect the purchasing power of solvent operators by 
influencing their ability to use and service debt. 
Sensitivity of BASE Results to Interest Rates 
Sensitivity to changes in the assumed interest rate are demonstrated in Table 
9 for the BASE run. Average interest rates of 8 and 12 percent are compared to 
the BASE assumption of 10 percent. The range for the percent of operators with 
cash shortfalls is 30 to 39 percent for interest rates of 8 to 12 percent. Using 
2The calculation is made using Equation (10) for theoretical asset purchases. 
average interest rates of 8 rather than 10 percent ίn the simulation, interest and 
principal shortfalls are projected to be $4.75 billion, or $1.3 bίllion loνιer than the 
BASE. Hίgher ίnterest rates of12 percent ίmply a $1.7 bίllion ίncrease in total 
shortfall from the BASE shortfalls to $7.8 bίllion. Changes in interest rates 
above or below the mean of 10 are apparently not symmetric. Higher ίnterest 
rates ίncrease the repayment shortfalls of stressed farmers more than lower 
ίnterest rates reduce cash shortfalls. 
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Table 9. BASE Scenario Sensitiνity to Interest Rate Assumption, United.States. 
lnterest Rate 
BASE 
ί = 8 ί = 10 ί = 12 
Assets Sold 
Percent 6.1 7.2 8.7 
Amount($B) 27.709 32.839 39.617 
Debt Liquidated 
Percent 21.2 24.0 27.8 
Amount ($Β) 26.873 30.531 35.331 
Debt W ritten Off 
Percent 5.7 6.2 6.9 
Amount($B) 7.233 7.887 8.725 
Operators Selling Out 
Percent 11.8 13.2 15.1 
Number 75,346 83,821 96,329 
Operators with Negatίve NCF 
Before Intervention 
Percent 30.1 33.9 39.0 
Number 191,319 215,822 248,409 
Interest Shortfall ($Β) $1.461 $2.464 $3.785 
Prίncipal Shortfall ($Β) $3.289 $3.620 $4.013 
Total Shortfall ($Β) $4.750 $6.083 $7.798 
Assets Purchased 
Percent 15.8 11.5 9.0 
Amount ($Β) 72.547 52.578 40.991 
Restructuring Requirements Over Time Using BASE Scenario 
Table 10 provides estimates of changes in asset and debt holdings oνer time 
using the BASE scenario. Asset sales are allowed only with the exit offailing 
farms. Some farms not failing may haνe negative NCF at the end ofthe year. 
Hence, the results show moνement toward an equilibrium rather than the end 
results ofrestructuring. Rates ofreturn and cash recoνery rates are assumed to 
decline oνer time (Tables 3 and 4). Total commercial operator debt in the second 
year is assumed to equal total commercial operator debt in the first year less debt 
liquidated in the first year. Total debt for the third year is calculated similarly. 
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Table 10. Expected Changes Over'Γime in Response to Financial Stress with 
BASE Scenario, United States. 
Year Ι Year 2 Year3 
Assets Sold 
Percent 7.2 3.1 2.8 
Amount ($Β) 32.839 14.152 12.641 
Debt Liquidated 
Percent 24.0 9.3 8.7 
Amount ($Β) 30.531 8.981 7.594 
Debt W ritten Off 
Percent 6.2 0.4 0.4 
Amount ($Β) 7.880 0.415 0.306 
Operators Selling Out 
Percent 13.2 3.0 2.2 
Number 83,821 16,358 11,852 
Operators with Negative NCF 
Before lntervention 
Percent 33.9 21.0 22.1 
Number 215,822 116,219 118,464 
lnterest Shortfall ($Β) 2.464 0.415 0.341 
Principal Shortfall ($Β) 3.620 1.736 1.365 
Total Shortfall ($Β) 6.083 2.151 1.706 
Assets Purchased 
Percent 11.5 11.5 10.7 
Amount($B) 52.716 52.578 48.823 
Since no attempt is made to model the asset purchasing patterns of solvent and 
financially stable operators, the value oftotal commercial operator assets is 
assumed to remain constant over time. This implies that assets sold as part ofthe 
restructuring or liquidation process are purchased by other commercial farm 
operators, so assets owned by commercial farm operators remain constant. 
The largest transition occurs ίη the first year when a large number of 
insolvent operators sell out. Only 3 percent ofremaining operators are 
technically insolvent or financial failures in the second year. Even fewer farms 
are classified as insolvent or failing the third year. Under these conditions and 
wi th the most stressed farms quitting earlier, 22 percent of operators have 
negative NCF in the third year. Interest shortfalls drop off dramatically after the 
34 
first year, but principal shortfalls remain significant even after 3 years oflimited 
restructuring. 
BASE Scenario with Unlimited Asset Sales 
Table 11 giνes national restructuring requirements for commercial farms 
attempting to correct cash flow problems using BASE scenario assumptions ίη 
conjunction with unlimited asset sales. As in Table 6, a sensitivity table format 
is used that incorporates three cash rates ofreturn and cash recoνery rates. The 
rates are the same as those used in Table 8--high and low values are 10 percent 
higher or lower than expected rates ofreturn and cash recovery rates. 
Comparisons ofresults in Tables 6 and 11 indicate the reduction in operator, 
asset, and debt liquidations with moderate adjustments prior to asset sales. 
Although liquidations are reduced, the magnitudes of required liquidation are 
still quite high. Given expected rates ofreturn and cash recoνery rates, 12 
percent fewer operators haνe negatiνe net cash flows. One-fourth of the operators 
with negatiνe NCF initially now project a positive cash flow. One-third fewer 
operators are expected to sell out because offinancial failure. 
Approximately 17 percent ofthe commercial agricultural sector's assets are 
sold compared to 22 percent (Table 6). Assets potentially purchased by solνent 
operators do not change since the financial position of nonstressed operators does 
not change with the availability ofrestructuring alternatives. 
The amount of debt liquidated falls from 66 percent (Table 6) to 51 percent 
(Table 11) with BASE assumptions and unlimited asset sales. Thus, the 
availability ofoff-farm work and the ability to increase farm income by moderate 
amounts can reduce the total volume of debt liquidated by a substantial amount. 
Debt written offdecreases from 5.1 to 3.7 percent. 
Our analysis suggests somejustification for considering financial policy 
initiatiνes. Results indicate that moderate improνements in the returns to 
agriculture and decreases in average interest rates charged ση outstanding debt 
will reduce, but not eliminate, the immediate need for large scale liquidation of 
debts and assets. More assets may be liquidated to stabilize the agricultural 
sector than asset markets can efficiently handle in the short run. 
Guaranteed Loans with Debt Adjustment 
Ιη 1980, a debt adjustment program for guaranteed operating loans and farm 
ownership loans was implemented. The program was designed to proνide credit 
to family fanns who did not haνe adequate loan security without debt 
adjustment. Το participate ίη the program, lenders were required to write-down 
} 
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Table 11. Liquidation Required to Service Remaining Debt from Projected Cash 
Flows Under Different Cash Recovery Rate and Rate ofReturn 
Assumptions in BASE Scenario (percent) 
Operators 
Debt Operators Operators with 
Assets Debt Written Selling Scaling Negatiνe Assets 
Region Sold Liquidated οιr Out Back NCF Purchased 
High Rates ofReturn to Operated Assets, High Cash Recovcry Rates 
East 3.2 17.2 0.8 1.3 15.8 17.1 11.6 
South 3.3 16.5 1.3 3.4 16.9 20.3 15.1 
Central 17.5 45.8 3.3 7.4 24.5 31.9 16.3 
West 11.9 47.7 0.7 2.5 30.5 33.1 9.0 
u.s. 11.8 39.0 2.3 5.3 22.8 28.1 14.1 
Expected Raιes ofReturn to Operated Assets, Expected Cash Recovery Rates 
East 4.8 23.0 1.0 1.9 20.9 22.8 9.8 
South 5.5 23.9 2.4 7.6 17.8 25.4 12.6 
Central 24.7 59.5 5.3 12.0 26.4 38.4 13.0 
West 16.1 58.4 1.0 3.4 33.9 37.2 7.5 
u.s 16.7 50.6 3.7 9.1 24.8 33.9 11.5 
Low Rates ofReturn to Operated Assets, Low Cash Recoνery Rates 
East 7.3 31.7 1.4 3.2 24.7 27.9 8.1 
South 7.9 32.2 3.0 9.3 22.0 31.4 10.4 
Central 33.8 76.1 9.2 15.7 36.1 51.9 10.5 
West 21.3 69.3 1.6 5.0 38.1 43.1 6.0 
U.S 23.0 64.0 6.1 11.5 32.4 43.9 9.4 
existing indebtedness so the new guaranteed loan would show a positive cash 
flow. The write-down by the lender could be taken in several ways: 
1. Α write-off of at least 10 percent of existing debt. 
2. Α reduction in the interest rate equivalent in present value terms to a 10 
percent debt write-off. 
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3. Α combination of a debt write-off and an interest rate reduction. Although 
loan guarantees are now made without requiring debt adjustment, an 
attempt is made through simulation to estimate the νa!ue of a debt 
adjustment program. 
Model Specification 
In the computer program, a!l operators unable to pay interest fu!ly are 
assurned e!igible to app!y for a debt adjustment. Α loan guarantee is proνided if, 
with a 10 percent write-down ofprincipal, the farm operator is able to show a 
positiνe cash flow. The va!ue ofthe simulated loan guarantee with debt 
adjustment in a!leviating financial stress is quite limited. None ofthe stressed 
operators in the samp!e qua!ified for the program. The addition to cash flow (or 
reduction in cash outflow) from the 10 percent reduction in principal and interest 
repayment did not provide enough change for operators to improνe substantia!ly 
the financia! condition ofthe farm. These simulation results suggest reasons for 
obserνed low participation rates in the debt adjustment program. 
Two constraints contribute to these resu!ts: 1) an assumption ofthe model 
and 2) the program eligibi!ity criterion. The modellimits the number of eligible 
farmers by stipulating that on!y farmers who cannot fu!ly pay interest are 
e!igib!e for financia] aid. Thus, operators with negative NCF because ofprincipa] 
payment shortfa!lε on!y are not e!igib!e for assistance. The second constraint is 
the Joan guarantee program requirement that firms show a positive cash flow 
after the principa] write-down. This constraint is apparent!y Jimiting for a!l 
e!igib!e farms. 
Interest Rate Buydown Programs 
Interest buydown programs are intended to proνide immediate reliefto 
financia!ly stressed farmers because they proνide income subsidies for interest 
shortfalJs in genera!, and may be broadened to coνer other cash shortfa11s. They 
aid in meeting current expenses so income generating capabi!ities are not 
impaired. These subsidies help reduce interest accurnulation while the operator 
attempts debt or asset restructuring. 
Α buydown that is not Jimited to the amount ofinterest shortfa11 may provide 
cash for principal repayment or consumption expenditures. This type ofprogram 
lacks limits on interνention costs to protect the public's investment. The 
taxpayer may bear the costs ofnot on!y buying time for the farmer by preventing 
interest accurηulation but a!so may assist in paying off debt and family Jiνing 
expez..ditures. In other words, since the subsidy is large enough to pay interest 
and principal, the farm's equity can increase as a result ofthe program. 
•. 
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Four interest buydown programs are evaluated ίη this section. The first is an 
FmHA-type buydown, a general buydown not limited to interest shortfalls but 
limited by maximum rates as established by the government and lender. The 
second alternative is a two-way buydown by the federal government and lender 
limited to interest payment shortfalls. The third program is targeted buydown 
and the fourth program is a buydown with a payment limitation. In each ofthe 
simulations, BASE assumptions regarding limited farm level restructuring are 
used in conjunction with policy specific criteria and assumptions. Costs of 
administering various programs are not estimated. Targeted programs might be 
more costly to aιhτ.inister than a general buydown because a farmer's eligibility 
for a program would have to be determinι:d. 
Two-way Interest Rate Buydown Not Limited to Interest Shortfalls 
FmHA has been directed to aid lenders in providing credi t to family farm 
operations with quaranteed loans who are temporarily unable to project a 
positive cash flow without a reduced interest rate. Lenders that participate in the 
program agree to reduce the interest rate paid on a loan or line of credit. In 
return, FmHA agrees to make annual interest rate buydown payments to the 
lender in an amount not to exceed 50 percent ofthe cost of reducing the interest 
rate on the loan or 2 percentage points. The FmHA buydown is not limited to the 
interest shortfall and so may provide cash for principal repayment or 
consumption expenditures. 
Model Specification. Since the FJ survey data provide no information on the 
amount of debt owed by an individual to a particular institution, the buydown 
was allowed for all individuals unable to make interest payments. Thus, any 
farmer with a cash shortfall exceeding principal due is eligible for an interest 
rate buydown. The federal government reduces interest rates by half of the 
points required for the farm to show a positive cash flow, or at most 2 points. The 
lender buys down interest rates by halfthe points required to project a positive 
cash flow, ifless than 4 points.3 Thus, average interest rates can be reduced by a 
maximum of 6 basis points. The maximum on effective buydown rates for both 
the federal government and the lender limit each entity's liability. 
Results. In the firstyear ofthe program, recipients ofthe buydown receive an 
average payment per farm of $24,294 (Table 12), calculated as total program 
costs divided by the number of operators who qualify for aid. More than two-
thirds ofoperators with negative NCF qualify for this buydown. One-third do not 
3 Α maximum for the bank's buydown was not included in legislation but was included in 
the simulation to protect the bank's investment. 
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Table 12. Expected Changes Over Time with a FmHA-type Interest Rate 
Buydown, United States. 
Year I Year2 Year3 
Assets Sold 
Percent 5.6 1.3 1.9 
Amount 25.648 5.757 8.818 
Debt Liquidated 
Percent 19.9 3.9 5.9 
Amount 25.306 3.98 5.77 
Debt Written Off 
Percent 5.1 0.2 0.3 
Amount 6.419 0.15 0.28 
Operators Selling Out 
Percent 10.8 1.1 1.6 
Number 68,533 6,390 9,007 
Operators with Negative NCF 
Before lntervention 
Percent 33.9 20.5 21.7 
Number 215,822 115,644 121,096 
Operators with Negative NCF 
Who Qualify for Aid 
Percent 67.6 32.3 29.8 
Number 145,853 37,352 36,135 
Total Costs ($Β) 3.543 1.322 1.427 
Federal Costs ($Β) 1.194 0.447 0.489 
State Costs ($Β) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Lender Costs ($Β) 2.350 0.875 0.938 
Α verage Payment Per Farm $24,294 $35,394 $39,480 
Interest Shortfall ($Β) 0.368 0.010 0.010 
Principal Shortfall ($Β) 2.184 1.017 0.831 
Total Shortfall ($Β) 2.553 1.027 0.840 
Assets Purchased 
Percent 11.5 11.3 10.3 
Amount($B) 52.699 51.944 47.366 
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qualify because they are able to pay interest fully, and are short only on principal 
repayment. After the buydown, an additional3 percent of total operators (almost 
9 percent ofoperators with a negative NCF initially) show positive cash flows. 
Total costs ofthe program in the first year ofthe projection are $3.5 billion, 
basically the difference in total principal and interest shortfalls between this 
scenario and the "no intervention" BASE scenario. The federal government 
absorbs abou t one-third of the costs wi th the banks wri ting off the remainder. 
Lenders benefit from this program since the federal government pays $1.2 billion 
to lenders for interest and principal repayment. The interest buydown becomes 
income to the bank that it would otherwise not receive. 
Over time, a smaller percentage of operators with negative NCF qualify for 
the buydown. Α larger percentage of operators are able to pay interest, and so are 
ineligible for the buydown. These percentages are based on a reduced sample 
population since farms that fail in the first year are assumed to exit farming and 
are removed from the sample. Average payments per farm increase over time, 
from $24,294 the first year to $39,480 in the third year, suggesting that more 
recipients ofthe buydown require the maximum 6 percent buydown or have 
larger average debt loads. Total costs ofthe program in the second and third 
years ofthe projection are approximately one-third of the costs ofthe first year at 
$1.3 to 1.4 billion. The split in costs remains fairly constant over time at one-
third for the federal government and two-tιirds for the bank. 
The number of operator~ selling out over the three year period is almost one-
fourth less than in the BASE scenario. Fewer operators than in the BASE run 
sell out in any given year (2.5 percent less in the first year) indicating that the 
program can successfully buy time for some operators to continue restructuring 
efforts. Both speed and magnitude of asset sales and debt liquidation are 
reduced. 
Two-way Interest Rate Buydown 
Model Specification. Costs of a two-way interest rate buydown with payments 
limited to interest shortfalls shared by the federal government and lender are 
estimated (Table 13). The federal government is assumed to buy down interest 
rates up to 2 points, or to the cash flow pointifit occurs with less than the 
maximum 2 points. An additional4 percent buydown in interest rates is provided 
by the banks as needed to eliminate cash shortfalls. Thus, the maximum 
buydown is 6 points, similar to the FmHA buydown, but the two-way interest 
rate buydown is limited to interest shortfalls. 
Results. Since the maximum rate in the FmHA-type program and two-way 
buydown is the same, the difference in total program costs ($1.5 billion) indicates 
the amoun t of paymen t exceeding interest shortfalls in the FmHA-type program. 
The costs to the federal government in the two-way buydown indicate operators 
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Table 13. Expected Changes Oνer Tirne with a Two-way Interest Rate Buydown, 
United States. 
Ycar I Year2 Ycar3 
Asset.s Sold 
Percent 6.0 1.3 2.2 
Amount 27.310 6.114 10.177 
Debt Liquidated 
Percent 21.0 4.2 6.9 
Amount 26.715 4.17 6.61 
Debt Written Off 
Percent 6.4 0.2 0.4 
Amount 8.163 0.23 0.40 
Operators Selling Out 
Percent 11.4 3.0 2.3 
Number 72,429 16,729 12,322 
Operators with Negative NCF 
Before Intervention 
Pεrcent 33.9 22.3 22.7 
Number 215,824 125,722 124,162 
Operators with Negative NCF 
Who Qualify for Aid 
Percent 67.6 36.3 35.0 
Number 145,860 45,647 43,496 
Total Costs ($Β) 2.096 0.491 0.548 
Federal Cost.s ($Β) 1.003 0.311 0.336 
State Costs ($Β) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Lender Costs ($8) 1.092 0.181 0.211 
Average Payment Per Farm $14,367 $10,765 $12,595 
lnterest Shortfall ($Β) 0.368 0.010 0.010 
Principal Shortfall ($Β) 3.620 1.845 1.701 
Total Shortfall ($Β) 3.988 1.855 1.711 
Assets Purchased 
Percent 11.5 11.4 10.4 
Amount ($Β) 52.699 52.069 47.540 
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with an interest rate shortfall avail themselves ofthe maximum government 
buydown because they require at least a two point break in interest rates to 
project a positive cash flow. In the first year, the average payment in the two-way 
buydown is $146,367. 
The federal government's portion of the buydown increases after the first year 
from less than 50 percent to slightly more than 60 percent (Table 13). Ifthe 
federal government's share is constant at 50 percent, the average percentage 
buydown required by an individual to cash flow is 4 points (2 points provided by 
the government and 2 by the lender). Since commercial operators remaining in 
business who qualify require an average uuydown less than 4 points, the 
government share of costs grows over time. 
Targeted Two-way Interest Rate Buydown 
Model Specification. Το be eligible for the two-way targeted buydown, farm 
operators must have equity greater than $50,000 but less than $250,000 and be 
unable to pay interest fully. Thus, the buydown is intended to provide funds to 
ease financial stress for farms with enough remaining equity to be considered 
viable. Farms with substantial amounts ofequity (greater than $250,000) are 
assumed to have financial resources to survive without public aid. 
Results. The equity bounds determining eligibility reduce the percentage of 
qualifying operators with negative NCF from 68 percent to 24 percent (Table 14). 
Since fewer farms are recipients ofbuydowns, this program does less than other 
buydown programs to stem the flow of operators who leave because offinancial 
problems. Program costs are also drastically reduced to almost one-fifth oftwo-
way buydown costs. The average payment the first year is $7,821, a little more 
than half ofthe average payment in the untargeted two-way buydown and one-
fourth ofthe FmHA buydown. Obviously, many severely stressed farms with 
large debt loads that would otherwise qualify for larger buydowns have been 
eliminated from the program by equity constraints. 
Two-way Interest Rate Buydown with Payrnent Lirnitation 
Α $10,000 maximum individual payment included in the two-way interest 
rate buydown reduces program costs (Table 15), but this effect is somewhat 
deceiving since the $10,000 maximum rarely if ever occurs before the 
government maximum buydown of2 points in interest rate, the difference in this 
program and the basic two-way buydown is mostly in the lender's position. Here, 
the lender takes income loss as an interest shortfall rather than as a write-down 
in interest. And, since interest shortfalls are added to debt ifthe operator 
remains in business, interest is accrued over time, and some of the income 
foregone may be recovered later. 
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Table 14. Expected Changes OverTime wit..lι a Targeted Two-way Interest Rate 
Buydown, United States. 
Year I Ycar2 Year3 
Assets Sold 
Percent 6.7 3.2 2.6 
Amount 30.554 14.620 12.045 
Debt Liquidated 
Percent 22.8 9.6 8.2 
Amount 28.972 9.39 7.25 
Debι Written ΟΠ 
Percent 6.0 0.4 0.3 
Amount 7.595 0.42 0.25 
Operators SeJJing Οuι 
Percent 12.2 3.2 2.1 
Number 77,353 17,900 11,353 
Operators with Negative NCF 
Before lntervention 
Percent 33.92 21.7 22.0 
Number 215,824 122,612 119,977 
Operators with Negative NCF 
Who Qua]ίfy for Aid 
Percent 24.1 19.6 37.2 
Number 51,964 24,062 44,589 
Tota] Costs ($Β) 0.406 0.108 0.098 
Federal Costs ($Β) 0.229 0.078 0.053 
State Costs ($Β) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Lender Costs ($Β) 0.178 0.029 0.044 
Α verage Payment Per Farm $7,821 $4,481 $2,187 
lnterest ShortfaJJ ($Β) 2.070 0.343 0.266 
Principa] ShortfaJJ ($Β) 3.620 1.784 1.392 
Total Shortfall ($Β) 5.690 2.127 1.658 
Assets Purchased 
Percent 11.5 11.4 10.6 
Amount ($Β) 52.699 52.303 4δ.656 
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Table 15. Expected Changes Oνer Time with a Two-way Interest Rate Buydown 
Subject to Payment Limit, United States. 
Year 1 Year2 Year3 
i Assets Sold 
Percent 6.3 3.5 1.3 
..... Amount 28.762 15.822 5.930 ι 
; 
Debt Liquidated 
~ Percent 21.9 10.3 4.3 
' Amount 27.800 10.22 3.80 ! 
Debt Written Off 
Percent 5.6 0.4 0.2 
Amount 7.149 0.41 0.19 
Operators Selling Out 
Percent 11.5 3.6 2.1 
Number 73.433 20,012 11,246 
" Operators with Negatiνe NCF 
--
8efore Interνention 
Percent 33.9 22.2 22.2 
Number 215,824 125,353 120,551 
Operators with Negatiνe NCF 
Who Qualify for Aid 
Percent 67.6 36.0 33.0 
Number 145,860 45,137 39,789 
Total Costs ($8) 1.003 0.308 0.311 
Federal Costs ($8) 1.003 0.308 0.311 
State Costs ($8) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Lender Costs ($Β) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Aνerage Payment Per Farm $6,876 $6,824 $7,827 
Interest Shortfall ($8) 1.461 0.268 0.178 
Principal Shortfall ($Β) 3.620 1.825 1.575 
Total Shortfall ($8) 5.080 2.093 1.753 
Assets Purchased 
Percent 11.5 11.4 10.4 
Amount ($Β) 52.699 52.166 47.538 
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Comparison of Interest Rate Buydowns Over Three Years 
Impacts ο η Farms. Interest rate buydown programs prevent accumulation of 
interest oνer time on financially stressed farms. As a result, fewer assets are 
sold, fewer debts are liquidated, and fewer farms fail. Ofthe interest buydown 
programs simulated, the FmHA-type program reduces the number of commercial 
operators selling out most over the three year period. It also does most to reduce 
the volume of assets sold as farms adjust to financial stress. 
The difference between BASE total shortfalls ($9.9 billion) and total shortfalls 
plus program costs with the FmHA-type program ($10.7 billion) is $758 million. 
Other buydown programs also haνe total shortfalls and program costs that exceed 
total shortfalls in the BASE program oνer three years. This indicates the 
increase in losses resulting from keeping some seνerely stressed farms in 
operation. Additional accrued losses in other programs range from $758 million 
with the FmHA buydown to $146 rnillion w: ~h the targeted two-way buydown. 
Impacts on Banks. Interest buydown programs impact banks two primary ways. 
First, if government agencies participate, funds receiνed by the lender reduce the 
lender's immediate loss ofincome. Second, ifthe bank participates ίη the 
buydown, the borrower's interest shortfalls are reallocated between interest 
shortfalls and interest written off. Because ofthis second irnpact, totallong run 
costs ofthe program are difficult to estimate. An interest shortfall rnay proνide 
income to the lender in the future ifthe farm rernains solνent. Interest written 
off, on the other hand, results in a permanent loss ofincorne. With the FmHA-
type buydown, banks absorb losses of $4.4 billion in interest and principal 
shortfalls and $4.2 billion in interest written off (the bank's interest buydown 
costs) oνer three years (Table 10). The total shortfall is $8.6 billion with the 
FmHA-type buydown, compared to $9.9 billion in the BASE run. 
Land Holding Cornpany 
The land holding cornpanies proposed by Harl (1986), the Farm Credit Council 
(1985) and others could insulate land andmachinery markets from a glut ofsales 
by debtors at or approaching insolνency. The proposed land holding company 
acquires land frorn farmers subject to foreclosure or bankruptcy, lenders holding 
land in inνentory, or farrners unable to service their real estate debt. Farmers 
who want to dispose ofproperty thus haνe a ready buyer eνen in areas where 
asset sales haνe flooded the market. The holding company serves as a shock 
absorber protecting collateral values and reducing the probability of serious 
'Όνershooting" in land prices (Harl, 1986). Oνershooting becomes a problem 
when financially stressed farmers attempt to restructure by selling assets. Lower 
asset νalues mean more assets have to be sold to generate reνenue to coνer cash 
shortfalls. 
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Harl's (1985Β) proposed federally chartered Agricultural Financing 
Corporation (AFC) has two major components. The first provides supplemental 
financing for "buying down" interest rates on farm loans for farms with the 
potential for positive cash flows. The second provides a mechanism for buying 
assets offarmers unable to project a positive cash flow without asset liquidation. 
The proposed AFC would acquire farmland at fair market value and rent the 
assets to farmers (with first preference to prior owners ofthe asset) at a fair 
rental rate. Lenders holding loans transferred to the AFC with associated 
collateral would be expected to take a write-down on the loan obligation or 
interest rate charged and could not charge an interest rate higher than the best 
rate charged their bestfarm customers. Prior owners ofthe assets who maintain 
continuous or near continuous rental of the asset would be eligible to repurchase 
the assets at fair market value. 
Model Speci!"ication 
In the simulation ofthe land holding company (LHC), the rudiments ofthe 
AFC and ACC are incorporated. The LHC is assumed to be a limited life 
corporation entitled to purchase assets from financially stressed farm operators. 
Borrowers with a negative NCF who are unable to make interest payments are 
allowed to sell assets to the LHC and lease them back at reasonable cash rental 
rates. In simulations over time, "reasonable" means current rental rates ifrates 
ofreturn exceed rental rates or one percentage point less than the rate of return if 
rental rates exceed rates ofreturn in the first year. With subsidized rental rates, 
farmers may sell fewer assets to the LHC than would have to be sold to project a 
positive cash flow with a sale!leaseback. 
Proceeds from a farm's sale of assets to the LHC are applied to debt reduction. 
Asset sales to the corporation are limited to half of assets owned or $300,000, 
unless the operator is insolvent. Insolvent operators transfer all assets to the 
holding company. Sellers to the LHC are required to purchase stock in the LHC 
equivalent to 10 percent ofthe assets transferred to it. 
Costs to the federal government of providing a LHC depend on the cost of 
funds used by the LHC to purchase assets and income earned by renting out 
assets purchased. Costs offunds are assumed to be 7.75 percent in each year, a 
rate equivalent to the sale price ofFarm Credit System bonds in February 1986 
(Webster, 1986). Total costs ofthe LHC include purchase of assets entering it 
plus the costs offinancing those purchases less rental income earned and less 
proceeds from sale of assets on or before the end of the enti ty's limi ted life. 
Results 
Almost 10 percent ofthe assets of commercial farm operators are sold, 2.5 
percent more than in the BASE run (Table 16). More debt is liquidated in the 
first year than in the BASE run (29 percent as opposed to 24 percent) because of 
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Table 16. Expected Changes Over Time with a Land Holding Company, United 
States. 
Year I Year2 Year3 
Assets Sold 
Percent 9.7 1.5 1.6 
Amount 44.380 7.007 7.191 
Debt Liquidated 
Percent 28.9 5.7 6.2 
Amount 36.640 5.16 5.27 
Debt Written Off 
Percent 6.6 0.3 0.2 
Amount 8.357 0.29 0.18 
Operators Selling Out 
Percent 9.5 1.9 1.4 
Number 60,718 10,491 7,473 
Operators with Negative NCF 
Before Intervention 
Percent 33.9 20.5 22.4 
Number 215,824 115,343 123,771 
Operators with Negative NCF 
Who Qualify for Aid 
Percent 67.6 41.5 35.5 
Number 145,860 47,829 43,992 
Total Costs ($Β) 0.864 0.087 0.145 
Federal Costs ($Β) 0.864 0.087 0.145 
State Costs ($Β) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Lender Costs ($Β) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Average Payment Per Farm $5,924 $1,817 $3,290 
lnterest Shortfall ($Β) 1.537 0.515 0.009 
Principal Shortfall ($Β) 2.273 1.292 1.508 
Total Shortfall ($Β) 3.810 1.807 1.517 
Assets Purchased 
Percent 11.5 12.0 10.4 
Amount ($Β) 52.699 54.777 47.540 
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debt retirement from the proceeds of asset sales to the LHC. More debt is written 
offwhen a stock purchase is required since failing farms have to apply some ofthe 
proceeds from sale of assets to stock purchases rather than debt retirement. 
Fewer operators fail with an operating LHC because of financial problems 
over time--9 .5 percent of commercial farms fail the first year and 12.4 percent of 
total sample operators liquidate completely in the three year period. Although 
many farms sell assets to the LHC, the average payment per farm is small since it 
is the costs of financing the program above rentals received ση the assets sold to 
the corporation. Over three years, assets sold and debt liquidated are 
approximately the same in the BASE and LHC simulations. With the LHC, 
though, an estimated 33,349 operators remain in business who fail in the BASE 
scenario. Fewer operators sell out in the LHC simulation than in any interest 
buydown programs simulated. 
Annual program maintenance costs are less than the cost ofmost buydown 
programs examined. The combined LHC maintenance costs and interest and 
principal payment shortfalls are substantially less than in other scenarios. The 
sum of interest and principal shortfalls and LHC maintenance costs is actually 
less ($1.7 billion) than the total shortfalls in the BASE scenario. However, when 
total cost ofasset purchases are considered, the costs ofthe LHC are high. Α 
rough calculation ofthe present value ofthe LHC is made assuming: 
1. Assets are purchased only in the first year. 
2. The total amount of assets purchased is $77 billion (17 percent ofthe total 
assets of commercial operators). 
3. The life ofthe LHC is five years. 
4. Assets are sold at the end ofthe fifth year. 
5. The cash rental rate is 6 percent ofthe initial market value. 
Total costs, given different assumptions about discount rates and rates of asset 
appreciation, are listed in Table 17. It could be argued that the discount rate 
should reflect some "social" rate that might be near 2 percent rather than the 
market interest rate that could equal or exceed 10 percent. 
Summary and Conclusions 
We have estimated the magnitude ofchange faced by the agricultural sector 
because of current farm financial conditions. Our simulation offarms' 
adjustment in response to financial stress relates farm-level changes to a sector 
response. Estimates ofnational restructuring requirements are large, even with 
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Table 17. Costs ofLand Holding Company ($Β), United States. 
Dίscount Rate 
2% 
5% 
10% 
0% 
13.6 
16.4 
34.3 
Annual Land Value Apprecίaιίon Rate 
Ι% 
10.1 
19.4 
31.9 
2% 
6.6 
16.4 
29.5 
optimistic assumptions about farm incomes, interest rates, asset market 
resiliency, and off-farm income availability. Financial conditions are 
particularly severe in the Central region and consequently that restructuring is 
expected to be extensive. 
Our examination ofthe financial status ofUnited States commercial farms 
suggests that stress on asset markets, agriculturallenders, and farm operators is 
not expected to abate soon. Many farms have debt levels that are unsupportable 
at projected income levels and interest rates. Continued shifts in asset and debt 
holdings are expected as the sector moves toward a financial equilibri um. Farms 
near failure financially are not substantially helped by moderate restructuring. 
Many severely stressed farms--those with high debt-to-asset ratios, large 
negative net cash flows, and low farm equities--may not be able to restructure 
debts and assets and will fail soon. In the Central region ofthe United States, a 
large number offarms are expected to liquidate completely. 
Our analysis suggestsjustification for considering public intervention to 
alleviate farm financial stress. The expected financial transi tion willlikely test 
the ability ofmarkets, individuals, institutions, and communities to make these 
changes. Financial policy can facilitate the transition process by buying time for 
operators and lenders to make needed long term adjustments and by ensuring 
that markets continue to operate efficiently. Interest rate buydowns and land 
holding company are programs that aid the farm in meeting current expenses 
and help reduce interest accumulation while the operator attempts debt or asset 
restructuring. Both the speed and magnitude of operator, asset, and debt 
liquidation can be reduced with these programs. The land holding company also 
benefits financially healthy farm operators by helping to stabilize farm asset 
markets and values. 
Benefits of different programs are hard to value because oftheir indirect and 
uncertain impact over time. The lender's participation in a program may lead to 
a certain loss offuture income ifinterest or debt is written off. Reduction of 
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either the interest or principal payment obligation has tax consequences that 
may be important to both the borrower and lender. 
An important attribute of public interνention to alleviate financial stress is 
the sharing among several entities of costs imposed by financial stress. Since 
causes offinancial stress include macroeconomic policies and lenders' and 
farmers' financial practices, i t is reasonable to expect the costs of financial stress 
to be shared by government, lenders, and farmers. Different programs distribute 
the cost burden and risks associated with farm failure differently among the 
entities involved. Simulation results indicate that interνention to alleviate farm 
financial stress may be expensive. Costs ofprograms depend on the extent of aid 
provided per individual and the number of operators qualifying for aid. 
Continuation of the current policy of"doing nothing" could result in costs--both in 
economic and human terms--that easily exceed the cost ofintervention. 
The long term viability offinancially stressed farms depends on their ability 
to improve cash Ποw and restructure debts and assets. Higher incomes, either 
farm or off-farm, enhance debt serνicing capability and reduce restructuring 
needs. Since farm incomes are not expected to improve soon, creation ofjobs ίη 
rural areas or off-farmjob training for financially stressed farmers or their 
families could be valuable. Extension or νocational school programs to improve 
management skills offarm operators could also prove beneficial in the long run. 
Helping farmers to explore on and off-farm opportunities is an urgent need. 
' ! 
• 
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